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Abstract 
John Greco believes that any satisfactory theory of testimonial 
knowledge should explain its practical nature—how testimonial 
knowledge pervades across cases in a way that much of our knowledge is 
dependable. He offers six cases: children know from their mothers, 
teachers (simple), friends know from each other and citizens (tricky), job 
interviewers and interrogators know from interviewees (difficult). In §2, I 
consider Greco’s formulation of these cases into the Reasons and Trust 
(RT) Dilemma: reductionism is too demanding for simple cases and non-
reductionism is too easy in difficult cases.      
 In §3, I begin by reframing Greco’s RT Dilemma. I will argue that 
the horns of Greco’s dilemma against reductionism and non-reductionism 
can be best understood as failing to accommodate the practical facts of 
testimony. I will then propose an approach to testimonial justification, 
knowing for. Hearers’ aims for knowing are related to the way hearers 
acquire testimonial justification. The purpose of knowing for is to give a 
comprehensive account of testimonial justification that includes 
reductionism’s positive reasons and non-reductionism’s trusting 
relationships. As a result, knowing for accommodates Greco’s six cases. In 
§4, I apply knowing for to the reductionist conception of positive reasons. 
In §5, I apply knowing for to the non-reductionist conception of a trusting 
relationship. Even though my view of knowing for alleviates both 
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reductionism and non-reductionism from Greco’s RT Dilemma, the 
unintended consequence is dissolving the debate between reductionism 
and non-reductionism. 
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§1. Introduction 
Consider a simple case of testimonial knowledge. Sarah tells her 
small child, Katie, “There is milk in the refrigerator.” Katie listens to her 
mother’s testimony and she knows that there is milk in the refrigerator. 
Why is Katie justified in believing that this is so? In this case, Katie’s 
justification is based on her trusting relationship with her mother. This 
case is simple, because the hearer is alleviated of the burden of needing 
additional grounds or evidence for accepting the testimony. Sarah says 
something to Katie. Based on Katie’s trusting relationship with Sarah, she 
knows it.          
 Now consider a difficult case of testimonial knowledge. Suppose 
that Sarah works as a police interrogator who questions uncooperative 
witnesses. After interrogating a witness for several hours, the person 
says, “Marie robbed the bookstore.” Sarah then researches previous 
robberies and gathers non-testimonially based reasons for corroborating 
the witness’s testimony. This case is difficult, because the hearer is 
burdened to acquire additional reasons for believing the testimony. Sarah 
listens to the testimony. However, the witness’ testimony does not 
suffice for Sarah knowing that Marie robbed the bookstore. Sarah must 
also gather non-testimonially based reasons to know.  
Camacho, John, UMSL, 2012, 5. 
 
In a tricky case originally proposed by Jennifer Lackey, suppose 
that Sarah is visiting Chicago.1 She asks a passerby, “Where is the Sears 
Tower?” The passerby says, “Two blocks east.” For Sarah to know the 
location of the Sears Tower, her justification depends upon either having 
non-testimonially based reasons or having a trusting relationship with the 
passerby. Sarah may believe that further reasons are required for her to 
know what the passerby says is true. On the other hand, Sarah may 
believe that the communal relationship between members of the Chicago 
community justifies her knowing that the Sears Tower is two blocks east. 
This case is tricky because either reasons or trusting relationships could 
be appropriate for a hearer to believe that the testimony is justified. 
Sarah listens to the passerby, but does not clearly know why she is 
justified in believing the testimony.      
 These cases indicate the methods of testimonial justification. 
Simple cases suggest that hearers’ trusting relationships with speakers 
ground the hearers’ belief that the testimony is justified; in contrast, 
difficult cases show that hearers’ positive reasons ground the hearers’ 
belief that the testimony is justified. As for tricky cases, hearers may 
plausibly believe that either trusting relationships or reasons ground their 
justification.        
                                                          
1
Jennifer Lackey calls the case CHICAGO VISITOR. She employs the case to reject the 
Credit Theory of Knowledge as answering the Value Problem. The credit theory has 
become a popular answer to the Value Problem and the theory is held by many virtue 
reliabilists such as John Greco and Wayne Riggs. For more on Lackey’s view, see Jennifer 
Lackey, “Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know,” Synthese 158, 345–361.  
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 John Greco argues that any satisfactory theory of testimonial 
justification must explain simple, difficult and tricky cases. Call the theory 
of testimonial justification that explains difficult cases in terms of 
hearers’ non-testimonially based reasons, or positive reasons, 
reductionism.2 Label the theory of testimonial justification that explains 
simple cases in terms of hearers’ trusting relationship with speakers, non-
reductionism.3 Greco turns simple, difficult and tricky cases into a 
dilemma against reductionism and non-reductionism, what I call, the 
Reasons and Trust (RT) Dilemma: reductionism is too demanding in 
simple cases and non-reductionism is too easy in difficult cases. On the 
demandingness horn, the reductionist standard of positive reasons 
prevents children from acquiring knowledge. On the easiness horn, the 
non-reductionist’s standard of trusting relationships licenses gullibility, 
because interrogators are licensed to accept false testimony from 
witnesses.  
Greco’s RT Dilemma can be understood as addressing further 
problems for reductionism and non-reductionism. C.A.J. Coady,4 Robert 
                                                          
2
The label ‘reductionism’ has been profusely used in the history of philosophy from 
David Hume to Rudolph Carnap and beyond. The origin of this view is traced back to 
Hume and the origin of ‘non-reductionism’ derives from Thomas Reid. In the 
epistemology of testimony, reductionism and non-reductionism are the two prominent 
theories of testimonial justification.  
3
The term, ‘non-reductionism’ is also referred to as ‘anti-reductionism.’  
4
C.A.J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).  
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Audi5 and Jennifer Lackey6 draw out, what I call, the practical facts of 
testimony: (1) testimony pervades across many areas of our knowledge 
and (2) much of our knowledge depends on testimony.7 Both are widely-
held truths about testimony. First, testimony is ubiquitous in our 
knowledge of science, journalism, geography, family history and many 
other areas. Since reductionism holds that children do not know, this 
theory fails to accommodate the practical fact that testimonial 
knowledge is pervasive among children. Second, a massive amount of our 
knowledge depends on testimony. Since non-reductionism holds that 
interrogators have knowledge, this view fails to accommodate the 
practical fact that testimony is dependable. In sum, reductionism and 
non-reductionism fail to explain the pervasive and dependable facts of 
testimony, respectively. 
In this paper, I attempt to rescue both reductionism and non-
reductionism from the horns of Greco’s RT Dilemma. What I intend to 
show is that, even though neither reductionism nor non-reductionism 
gets completely around the horns of Greco’s dilemma, the prospects of 
both theories explaining the practical facts of testimony are optimistic.  
 In §2, I will outline Greco’s Reasons and Trust Dilemma against 
                                                          
5
Robert Audi, “The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification,” 
American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 34 No. 4 (1997): 405-422. 
6
Jennifer Lackey, “Testimony Acquiring Knowledge from Others,” eds. Alvin I. Goldman 
and Dennis Whitcomb Social Epistemology Essential Readings, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2011), 71-91. 
7
By ‘dependable’, the view is not necessarily tied to a reliabilist theory of knowledge or 
any other theory that ultimately turns out true. 
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reductionism and non-reductionism. In §3, I will then reframe Greco’s 
dilemma. I will argue that the horns of Greco’s dilemma against 
reductionism and non-reductionism can be best understood as failing to 
comply with the practical facts of testimony discussed by Coady, Audi and 
Lackey. Given my interpretation of Greco’s dilemma, I will then attempt 
to save reductionism and non-reductionism with the same tool.  
 I will defend the view knowing for. Roughly, hearers’ aims for 
acquiring testimonial knowledge are related to testimonial justification. 
Knowing that the speaker’s testimony is for a police investigator, who will 
have specific attitudes and conduct certain actions, plays a role in 
determining what counts as the appropriate method of testimonial 
justification. Positive reasons and trusting relationships are two methods 
of testimonial justification. On this view, hearers’ beliefs and actions with 
the speaker’s testimony is vital to the way that they become justified in 
knowledge. Knowing that the testimony is for children, interrogators or 
tourists, who have different aims for seeking knowledge, explains why 
reasons are appropriate for investigators and trusting relationships are 
appropriate for children. Thus, knowing for is a comprehensive theory of 
testimonial justification, because it encompasses reductionism’s positive 
reasons and non-reductionism’s trusting relationships to explain Greco’s 
six cases.  
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In §4, I will apply the view of knowing for to the reductionist 
conception of a positive reason and the non-reductionist conception of a 
trusting relationship. First, I will argue that positive reasons must be 
commensurable with hearers’ aims for knowing. Reductionism does not 
completely avoid the Greco’s dilemma but the view gets closer to 
explaining the practical fact that testimony is pervasive. Second, I begin 
by analyze empirical research about children’s trusting relationships with 
their mothers. I will go on to identify empirically what counts as a trusting 
relationship between children and mothers. In the spirit of knowing for, I 
will then detail future experiments that test whether children and 
interrogators acquire testimonial knowledge based on a trusting 
relationship. The hope is to pave a way for non-reductionism to be 
compatible with the practical fact that testimony is dependable and avoid 
the Greco’s dilemma. Generally, if one is either a reductionist or non-
reductionist, my view of knowing for should be very attractive. Positive 
reasons and trusting relationships are compatible with the practical facts 
of testimony, because both are based on the same foundation, knowing 
for. At the same time, accepting knowing for includes the unintended 
consequence of dissolving the disagreement between reductionism and 
non-reductionism. The problem of testimonial justification—explaining 
why hearers are justified in believing testimony—is not an issue between 
reductionism’s positive reasons versus non-reductionism’s trusting 
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relationships; rather, the problem of testimonial justification becomes an 
issue of explaining the relation between the methods of testimonial 
justification (positive reasons and trusting relationships) and hearers’ 
aims for knowledge.  
 
§2. Greco’s Reasons and Trust Dilemma      
Hearers acquire testimonial knowledge in this general way: (a) 
speakers have knowledge, (b) speakers transmit true or reliable 
testimonially-based beliefs to hearers and (c) hearers believe that the 
testimony is justified. If speakers do not know or transmit false or 
unreliable testimony, hearers cannot acquire knowledge from testimony. 
The issue of testimonial justification is explaining the specific way that 
hearers are justified in believing the testimony.  
 Reductionism defends two claims: (1) “Reduction Component” 
that testimonial knowledge is reducible to other basic epistemic sources 
including perception, memory and inductive inference and (2) “Positive-
Reasons Component”—non-testimonially-based positive reasons 
necessarily and sufficiently justify hearers’ beliefs in the testimony. The 
former is a metaphysical thesis about the nature of testimony, and the 
latter is a claim about testimonial justification. Generally, a ‘positive 
reason’ is non-testimonially based evidence that justifies hearers’ beliefs 
in the testimony. Hearers acquire positive reasons for belief by making 
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deductive or inductive logical inferences from their perceptual faculty or 
memory. In this way, the reductionist story of testimonial justification is 
compatible with a principle of rationality—hearer knows that P based on 
having a positive reason for believing that P. David Hume and Elizabeth 
Fricker support versions of reductionism. Fricker claims, “The thesis I 
advocate…is that a hearer should always engage in some assessment of 
the speaker for trustworthiness. To believe what is assumed without 
doing so is to believe blindly, uncritically. This is gullibility.”8 ‘Assessment’ 
is understood as requiring positive reasons for testimonial justification. 
Hence, reductionism criticizes hearers, who immediately accept 
testimony without positive reasons, for being gullible or irrational.  
 Non-reductionism proposes two theses: (1) Distinctiveness 
Component—testimonial knowledge is an irreducible basic epistemic 
source similar to perception, memory and induction—and (2) Entitlement 
Component—hearers are entitled to believe a speaker’s testimony as 
knowledge in the absence of defeaters. Thomas Reid and Tyler Burge 
advocate versions of non-reductionism.9 Burge claims, 
Our entitlement to ordinary perceptual belief is usually sufficient 
for perceptual knowledge. It is usually sufficient even though we 
may be unable specifically to rule out various possible defeating 
conditions. If there is no reason to think that the defeating 
                                                          
8
Elizabeth Fricker, “Against Gullibility” in Knowing from Words, ed. B.K. Matilal and A. 
Chakrabarti (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004): 145. 
9
Given my criteria between reductionism and non-reductionism, theories such as 
interpersonal relationship views are counted as non-reductionist views, because 
justification is nonevidential and the interpersonal relationship is central to the 
epistemology of testimony.  
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conditions threaten, one has knowledge despite ignoring them. 
Something similar holds for acquisition of belief from others. 
Other things equal, ordinary interlocution suffices for 
knowledge.10 
  
Burge proposes that an interlocution explains why testimonial knowledge 
is on par with perception, induction and memory as an irreducible or 
basic epistemic source. However, for Burge, entitlement is not equivalent 
to justification, because a subject must articulate her reasons for 
justification. Alternative views have emerged to identify the irreducible 
epistemic source. For example, John Hardwig claims, “The 
trustworthiness of members of epistemic communities is the ultimate 
foundation for much of our knowledge”11 If one accepts that testimonial 
knowledge is an irreducible epistemic source, one is committed to non-
reductionism. For the purpose of this paper, I will narrowly deal with the 
non-reductionist theory which holds that a trusting relationship explains 
why testimonial knowledge is a basic epistemic source. Since hearers 
have a trusting relationship with speakers, hearers become justified in 
accepting a speaker’s testimony as knowledge except in the face of 
defeaters. These are defeating reasons or reasons against accepting 
testimony. There are psychological and normative defeaters. 
Psychological defeaters are a hearer’s experiences, doubts or beliefs 
                                                          
10
Tyler Burge, “Content Preservationism,” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 102, No. 4, 
(1993): 457-488, 485.  
11
 John Hardwig, “The Role of Trust in Knowledge,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 88, 
No. 12, (1991): 693-708, 694. 
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which indicate that hearer’s belief is unreliably formed or false.12 
Normative defeaters are experiences, doubts or beliefs that a hearer 
ought to possess, because they indicate that the hearer’s belief is 
unreliable or false given the available evidence. Hearers must be aware of 
defeaters; if not, they commit epistemically unacceptable practices that 
undermine testimonial justification.13    
 John Greco gives the following cases of testimonial knowledge: 
difficult (1 and 2), tricky (3 and 4) and simple (5 and 6). 
Case 1. A seasoned investigator questions a potentially 
uncooperative witness.                                                 
Case 2. A job applicant tells you that he has no criminal record.                  
Case 3. You ask directions from a stranger in an unfamiliar city. 
For example, where is the train station?     
Case 4. You ask your friend whether he intends to come to your 
party, and he says yes.                    
Case 5. A third-grade teacher tells her student that France is in 
Europe.                      
Case 6. A mother tells her adolescent child that there is milk in the 
refrigerator.14        
   
Testimonial knowledge ranges from mildly helpful information to 
powerful truths. Every day, children know about the locations of several 
kinds of drinks and foods in refrigerators. Students learn about the 
Earth’s distance from the sun and who will not attend the school dance. 
Journalists interview sources to find the next story; investigators figure 
                                                          
12
Jennifer Lackey, “Introduction” in Epistemology of Testimony (eds.) Jennifer Lackey 
and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Oxford University, 2006) 1-21, 4.  
13
Jennifer Lackey, “Introduction,” 4. 
14
John Greco, “Testimonial Knowledge and the Flow of Information” in Epistemic 
Evaluation (eds.) John Greco and   David Henderson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012 Forthcoming), 8.  
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out who robbed the bookstore. These cases lead to contrasting views of 
testimonial justification. Sometimes, justifying testimony is quick and 
simple. If your mom says that the milk is in the refrigerator, you listen 
and know where the milk is. In other cases, we are unsure about exactly 
how to justify testimony. Testimonial justification is tricky. Moreover, 
justifying a speaker’s testimony can be a lengthy and difficult process. For 
example, jurors may take months or years to be justified in believing a 
witness’ testimony. In difficult cases, testimony is imperative to whether 
hearers acquire knowledge. It’s remarkable that testimonial knowledge 
works at all.         
 Greco argues that reductionism and non-reductionism fail to 
satisfactorily explain simple, tricky and difficult cases. He formulates 
simple and difficult cases into the Reasons and Trust Dilemma: 
1. Either testimonial knowledge requires reasons on the part of 
the hearer or it does not.                
2. If Reductionism is true, then testimonial knowledge requires 
reasons on the part of the hearer. Testimonial knowledge 
becomes too demanding; at least, cases of school teachers’ 
and mothers’ testimony to small children will not be included 
as knowledge that should be included.                               
3. If Non-reductionism is true, then testimonial knowledge does 
not require reasons on the part of the hearer. Testimonial 
knowledge becomes too easy; at least, cases of police 
investigators and job interviewers will not count as knowledge 
that should be included.                                                                      
4. Therefore, an adequate account of testimonial knowledge, 
which includes both simple and difficult cases as genuine 
knowledge, is impossible.15   
                                                          
15
John Greco “Testimonial Knowledge and Flow of Information” in Epistemic Evaluation, 
(eds.) John Greco and David Henderson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 9-10. 
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A unified theory is challenging. The force of the dilemma lies in 
developing a theory that is neither too demanding that it omits cases 5 
and 6, nor too easy and losing the explanation to cases 1 and 2. The 
epistemic standards of testimonial justification fluctuate between 
demanding and easy. Testimonial knowledge for police investigators and 
job interviewers (difficult) favor reductionism. Greco claims, “The 
investigator asks questions and the witness answers them, but clearly the 
investigator should not just believe whatever the witness says.”16 
Investigators and interviewers demonstrate expert perception and 
induction in discerning true from false testimony. Requiring positive 
reasons to justify speakers’ testimony seems right. But when the same 
standard of requiring reasons is applied to simple cases, the reasons 
become too demanding for children to accept testimony from their 
elders. 
Testimonial knowledge for children knowing their mothers’ 
testimony favors non-reductionism. Greco affirms, “Here it is at least 
plausible that something epistemically special is going on—that 
testimonial justification and knowledge depends on a trusting 
relationship between speaker and hearer that is present in this example 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Greco emphasizes a relationship as something epistemically special. Others such as 
Jennifer Lackey may consider this emphasis as an interpersonal view of testimony. For 
my purposes, I align with Greco and develop the view as a possible non-reductionist 
theory.   
16
John Greco, “Recent Work on Testimonial Knowledge” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 49, 1 (2012): 15-28, 20. 
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but not in the first.”17 The trusting relationship between children and 
mothers allows children to accept their mother’s testimony as 
knowledge. Intuitively, children appear to know without reasons. 
Children listen to people with whom they have a close relationship, and 
gain knowledge. If children do, in fact, have testimonial knowledge, non-
reductionism is true about children knowing in the absence of defeaters. 
But, of course, non-reductionism cannot help but also fail to appreciate 
the positive reasons in difficult cases. Greco’s attack is limited to versions 
of non-reductionism which hold that a trusting relationship makes 
testimonial knowledge a basic epistemic source. Hearers are entitled to 
accept testimony based on a trusting relationship with speakers. 
However, a trusting relationship is not sufficient for interrogators’ 
justification. Interrogators need to be sure that the speaker’s testimony is 
true. And yet, if interrogators need positive reasons for justification, this 
reductionist view cannot explain why children know. This is the puzzle. 
Next I will strengthen Greco’s RT Dilemma. As a result, the horns of the 
RT dilemma are understood as general problems for reductionism and 
non-reductionism. 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
John Greco, “Recent Work in Testimonial Knowledge,” 20.   
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§3. Knowing For 
 This section has two objectives. First, I will argue that Greco’s RT 
Dilemma draws attention to two practical facts about testimony. Greco’s 
objections leveled against reductionism and non-reductionism can be 
understood as both theories failing to appreciate these practical facts. 
Second, I will provide the groundwork for solving Greco’s dilemma by 
defending a novel view called knowing for. I will argue for a relation 
between testimonial justification and hearers’ aims for knowledge. The 
hope is to explain why both positive reasons and trusting relationships 
are satisfactory methods of testimonial justification for different cases. In 
the next section, I will employ the view of knowing for to revise the 
conceptions of positive reasons and trusting relationships for solving for 
Greco’s RT Dilemma.  
Greco argues that reductionism and non-reductionism fail as 
satisfactory theories. Reductionism fails because it excludes children 
from acquiring testimonial knowledge from their parents or teachers. The 
intuition is that children, in fact, seem to know when reductionism claims 
that they do not know. Non-reductionism fails because it includes 
interrogators as acquiring knowledge from uncooperative witnesses. The 
intuition is that interrogators, in fact, seem not to know when non-
reductionism claims that they know. Greco’s RT Dilemma seems right but 
why is it so?         
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 On my view, Greco’s RT Dilemma highlights two practical facts 
about testimony. First, testimony is pervasive within our knowledge. 
Second, much of our knowledge depends on testimony. C.A.J. Coady, 
Robert Audi and Jennifer Lackey emphasize these widely-held truths.  
Coady claims: 
It seems then that testimony is very important in the formation of 
much that we normally regard as reasonable belief and that our 
reliance upon it is extensive. Furthermore, this reliance is not 
limited to the everyday or the merely practical, since highly 
developed theoretical activities are also marked by a reliance 
upon testimony. This is particularly noticeable in the social 
sciences and in such studies as history but it is also a feature of 
the physical sciences... Inasmuch as a social science has a strong 
historical element, like anthropology, then it will have a similar 
reliance on testimony, but even such a discipline a psychology is 
very dependent upon testimony for its data, as is evident from the 
perusal of texts on social psychology or even perception.18 
 
Coady emphasizes that testimony plays a role in our everyday and 
theoretical activities. Robert Audi highlights the role of testimony in 
epistemology:  
Testimony is a pervasive and indispensable source of knowledge 
and justification, and it may be significant for the theory of 
communication and the psychology of belief acquisition as it is for 
epistemology. It is a central concern of social epistemology, in 
which philosophers have shown increasing interest.19 
 
Audi distinguishes the practical fact that testimony is pervasive and the 
fact that it is a dependable source of knowledge. Audi also points out the 
implications of not recognizing the practical facts of testimony. He claims, 
                                                          
18
C.A.J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 8.  
19
Robert Audi, “The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification” 
American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 34 No. 4, (October 1997): 405-422, 405. 
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Much of human experience is occupied with speaking or listening 
to others, and in life as we know it we could not have much 
knowledge, if indeed we could know anything at all, without 
relying on what others tell us.20 
 
Jennifer Lackey suggests the universal acceptance of these practical facts 
of testimony. 
Virtually everything we know depends in some way or other on 
the testimony of others—what we eat, how things work, where 
we go, even who we are. We do not, after all, perceive firsthand 
the preparation of ingredients in many of our meals, or the 
construction of the devices we use to get around the world, or the 
layout of our planet, or our own births and family histories. There 
are all things that we are told….Scientific discoveries, battles won 
and lost, geographic developments, customs and traditions of 
distant lands–all of these facts would be completely lost to us. It 
is, therefore, no surprise that the importance of testimony, both 
epistemological and practical, is nearly universally accepted.21 
  
Coady, Audi and Lackey first point out that testimonial knowledge is 
ubiquitous. Testimony pervades across countless areas and practices in 
science, law, geography, history, communication, psychology, family and 
many others. This is a descriptive fact about our everyday social 
practices. Second, testimony is dependable in a way that makes our 
practices mostly accurate. If we reject that testimony is a dependable 
source of knowledge, then a problem arises. We would not actually know 
much of what we take ourselves to know. In light of the practical facts, I 
reframe Greco’s RT Dilemma to RT Dilemma*. Hopefully, the 
                                                          
20
Robert Audi. “Testimony as a Social Foundation of Knowledge” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research (October 2011): DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00525.x, 1-
25, 1. 
21
Jennifer Lackey, “Testimony Acquiring Knowledge from Others” in Social Epistemology: 
An Anthology (ed.) Alvin Goldman and Dennis Whitcomb (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011): 71-91, 71.  
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reconstruction will also make apparent the solutions for reductionism 
and non-reductionism.       
 The RT Dilemma* is the following:  
1. A satisfactory theory of testimonial justification must 
accommodate the practical facts that testimonial knowledge is 
pervasive and dependable.  
2. If reductionism is true and does not include children as 
acquiring testimonial knowledge from their parents or close 
ones, reductionism fails to explain the practical fact that 
testimony is pervasive.  
3. If non-reductionism is true and includes interrogators as 
acquiring testimonial knowledge from uncooperative 
witnesses, non-reductionism fails to explain the practical fact 
that testimonial knowledge is dependable.  
4. Therefore, reductionism and non-reductionism fail to 
accommodate the practical facts of testimonial knowledge.  
 
RT Dilemma* showcases the roles that the practical facts play in Greco’s 
dilemma. The practical fact of pervasiveness is a problem for 
reductionism. Reductionism’s positive reasons requirement narrows the 
cases of genuine testimonial knowledge. If reductionism cannot capture 
all of these cases, such as children acquiring testimonial knowledge, the 
view faces counterexamples. As a result, reductionists need a flexible 
theory that aligns with the pervasiveness of testimony. On the other 
hand, the practical fact of dependability is a problem for non-
reductionism. Non-reductionism’s trusting relationship between speakers 
and hearers is not always a dependable way for hearers to acquire 
knowledge. If non-reductionism cannot capture the fact that we depend 
upon testimony, such as interrogators acquiring testimonial knowledge, 
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non-reductionism is unsatisfactory. Non-reductionists need an accurate 
theory that accommodates the fact that testimony is dependable. In sum, 
reductionist accounts need to be more flexible and non-reductionist 
accounts need to be more accurate. How can this be done? On my view, 
both theories advance their agendas so long as they are grounded in a 
similar way. 
I motivate the view of knowing for with two assumptions. The first 
assumption is that testimonial knowledge is a relation between speakers 
and hearers. The assumption derives from separate claims by Linda 
Zagzebski and Robert Audi. Zagzebski describes a central feature of 
knowledge, “Knowing is a relation between a conscious subject and an 
object, where the object (but possibly not the immediate object) is some 
portion of reality. The relation is cognitive. That is to say, the subject 
thinks, not just senses or feels the object. More specifically, knowing 
includes believing.”22 The take-home point is that knowledge involves a 
relation. Zagzebski considers this idea to be a widely-held assumption. If 
testimonial knowledge is an instance of knowledge, generally, we may 
also say that testimonial knowledge involves a relation. Audi supports 
this idea of testimony:  
Testimony is normally social in having a recipient as well as an 
attester. But we might allow, as a limiting case, solitary testimony, 
as with what one writes in a diary. Even that kind of attestation is 
implicitly social. It is at worst an idealization to conceive 
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testimony as social. We ourselves are hearers of even our silent 
affirmations; our later selves are a potential audience for earlier 
entries in a diary.23 
 
Audi suggests that testimony involves a relation between speakers and 
hearers. The relation is not necessarily social, because we can be both 
speaker and hearer of our own testimony. For example, a relation exists 
between speakers and their diaries. Consider a person at time, T1, who 
writes words in her diary and then the same person reads her words at 
time, T2. The person who is the speaker at T1 is the same person who is 
the hearer at T2. The same person is related to herself at different times. 
Moreover, a relation exists between my current self and the self who 
hears my own silent affirmations. I can speak the words that I form and 
be the only person who hears them. Given that knowledge is a relation 
and testimony is a relation, it is obvious that testimonial knowledge is a 
relation between speakers and hearers.     
 The second assumption is that testimonial justification comes in 
degrees. This is also a widely-held assumption and can be indirectly 
attributed to Susan Haack, 
Ordinary usage of ‘knows,’ etc., is shifting and conflicting because 
of an underlying tension: justification comes in degrees, 
knowledge doesn’t. Justification comes in degrees; or, to put the 
point another way, one may be more or less justified in believing 
something. For instance, we speak of someone’s having good but 
not conclusive evidence; of someone’s belief being flimsy 
evidence; of someone’s having some justification for believing 
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such-and-such, but failing to take account of that fact that so-and-
so; of jumping to conclusions; of incomplete or—instructive 
ambiguity—‘partial’ evidence.24  
Haack’s view of the tension between knowledge and justification is 
applicable for explaining testimonial knowledge and justification. 
Hearers’ testimonial knowledge is definitive. Nevertheless, hearers 
become justified in believing testimony in different ways. For children to 
drink milk, a trusting relationship gives them an ‘adequate’ or maybe a 
‘partial’ justification for knowing; on the other hand, positive reasons 
mostly give us ‘conclusive’ justification. For the interrogator who wants 
to know who robbed the bookstore, a trusting relationship with the 
speaker is flimsy method of justification. Hence, the objection goes that a 
trusting relationship does not explain the practical fact that testimony is 
dependable. If justification comes in degrees, then a trusting relationship 
is located toward the weaker side of the spectrum. A trusting relationship 
is sometimes dependable enough for hearers to know. However, if the 
knowledge is for interrogators, a trusting relationship is not dependable 
enough to provide sufficient justification. Interrogators need conclusive 
justification. Children do not always need conclusive justification. 
Suppose that a child looks in the refrigerator and perceives the milk and 
infers that there is milk in the refrigerator. This child has conclusive 
justification. However, it is excessive to require that the child always 
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perceive and inductively infer that the milk is in the refrigerator for the 
child to know. If justification is understood in terms of positive reasons, 
then the objection goes that requiring a positive reason does not explain 
the practical fact that testimony is pervasive, because a positive reason is 
an instance of conclusive justification and we can be justified without 
having conclusive justification. Haack is correct that justification comes in 
degrees. The way that positive reasons and trusting relationships work in 
some cases but not all cases supports Haack’s view of a spectrum of 
justification. Positive reasons and trusting relationships appear located 
on opposite ends of this spectrum. As a result, what epistemologists need 
is a comprehensive theory of testimonial justification that includes both 
positive reasons and trusting relationships. If we accept that testimonial 
knowledge is a relation between speakers and hearers and testimonial 
justification comes in degrees, the idea of knowing for has traction.  
 We acquire testimonial knowledge for many aims. We aim to 
know where the milk is, because we want to drink it. We aim to know 
who robbed the bookstore, so that we can arrest them. We aim to know 
the location of the Sears Tower in order to visit it. We even aim to know 
because we are curious. Testimonial justification is related to our aims, 
specifically with respect to identifying the appropriate method for 
justifying testimony. The virtue of positive reasons prevails in difficult 
cases. Interrogators are required to have reasons in order to know. The 
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idea seems right, but why is it? One answer is that if the interrogator is 
justified in knowing the witness’ testimony, the hearer will likely arrest 
someone for committing a crime. Testimonial justification is difficult. The 
virtue of trusting relationships flourishes in simple cases. A child has a 
trusting relationship with her mother and knows that the milk is in 
refrigerator based on that trust. Why is this idea right? If the child is 
justified in knowing her mother’s testimony, she will likely use the milk to 
drink it. Testimonial justification is simple. Surely, one may say, a child 
knows the location of the milk based on trusting her mother. Both 
theories seem right. How can this be so? My answer is that Greco’s cases 
reveal a neglected feature of testimonial justification; that is, hearers’ 
aims for knowing is related to the methods of testimonial justification, 
positive reasons and trusting relationships. If my view can explain why 
positive reasons and trusting relationships are plausible, then the view 
may provide insights for enhancing both theories.   
 Hearers’ aims for knowing are related to testimonial 
justification.25 To motivate this view consider Case 7: 
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Case 7. Tom, Jeff and Kim are roommates. Jeff and Kim are close 
friends with each other. Tom is not close friends with Jeff and 
Kim. In addition, Jeff and Kim usually tell each other accurate 
testimonially-based beliefs. One night, Tom answers the door and 
after greeting the person, he asks Kim, “What time did Jeff say 
that he left Halo Bar?” Kim responds, “11:00pm.” Tom further 
says, “Well, the cops are at the door and they want to know. Are 
you sure?” Kim hesitates, “Hold on! I’m not that sure!” 
 
Kim knows that Tom left the Halo Bar at 11:00pm. Kim’s friendship with 
Jeff plays a role in partially justifying her knowledge. Furthermore, Kim 
has background knowledge that Jeff usually tells her accurate testimony. 
Kim may even feel confident in knowing that Tom left Halo Bar at 
11:00pm. Now, if Tom wants to know the time and asks Kim, she says, 
“11:00pm.” Yet, once the cops want to know and Kim knows that Tom 
will tell the cops, Kim resists saying a definitive time. Suppose that Kim 
does not believe that Jeff did anything wrong. Her reticence to tell Jeff an 
explicit time remains appropriate, but why? The idea is that knowing for 
Kim is, in some way, different than knowing for Tom and also knowing for 
police officers. This is the rough intuition. Knowing for friends, strangers, 
children and police investigators appears different. Why is this so? On my 
view, hearers’ aims for knowing are related to hearers’ method of 
testimonial justification, positive reasons or trusting relationship. If Tom 
acquires testimonial knowledge from Kim, Tom’s aim is to tell the 
information to police officers. Tom’s justification must be strong. If the 
police officers acquire knowledge, their aims include beliefs and actions 
toward Jeff. Suppose that the officers aim to arrest Jeff. Their justification 
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should be even stronger than Tom’s justification. Reductionism’s account 
of positive reasons is an appropriate method of testimonial justification 
for the officers and Tom. Kim’s aims are different from Tom’s and the 
police officers’ aims. Kim’s justification is based on her trusting 
relationship with Jeff. Kim’s justification is sufficient for her to know but it 
is not strong enough for Tom and the officers to know given their aims. 
As soon as Kim knows that Tom will use her testimony to tell the police 
officers, Kim says, “Hold on! I’m not that sure!” Furthermore, neither 
Tom nor police officers have a trusting relationship with Jeff. Non-
reductionism’s account of a trusting relationship is an appropriate 
method for justifying Kim’s knowledge. Generally, Case 7 is a device to 
bring out the relation between hearers’ aims for knowing and methods of 
testimonial justification. 
 One may believe that testimonial justification is related to the 
social roles among friends, strangers, children and interrogators. Based 
on such social roles, hearers become justified in particular ways. For 
example, if two people are friends and both have the social role of 
friendship with the other, then both people are permitted to trust what 
the other says. If the friends did not have this social role and are 
strangers, then the people would need positive reasons to accept the 
other’s testimony. The problem with this ‘social role’ view is that hearers’ 
social roles do not entirely inform the appropriate way to justify 
Camacho, John, UMSL, 2012, 28. 
 
testimony. If we alter the aims for knowing, then some close friends 
would rely on their trusting relationship; however the same friends 
would also need positive reasons.  For example, some friends may trust 
each other when the knowledge is trivial. Greg asks Amanda, “Where is 
the meeting?” Amanda responds, “At the coffee shop.” Greg may think, 
“Now, I know that the meeting is at the coffee shop.” Why? Greg trusts 
Amanda. However, if Greg is delivering a speech that can drastically help 
or harm his career, Greg may want to be sure that the meeting is in the 
coffee shop. Greg may not merely trust Amanda but want positive 
reasons for justification. In this way, hearers’ aims for knowing seem 
related to knowledge. 
The view of knowing for becomes transparent: 
Knowing For: A hearers’ aim for acquiring testimonial knowledge 
is related to what counts as the appropriate method of 
testimonial justification.  
 
The methods of testimonial justification include, but are not limited to, 
reductionism’s positive reasons and non-reductionism’s trusting 
relationships. The crux of the view lies in specifying what hearers’ aims 
are. I define ‘aims’ as hearers’ attitudes and actions. Hearer’s ‘attitudes’ 
include the following: beliefs, desires, intentions and goals. Hearer’s 
‘actions’ involve directed or intentional actions and excludes merely 
bodily movement. Hearers strive to know in order to form other beliefs 
or have other attitudes. For example, I ask Dave who won the football 
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game between the University of Missouri and University of Georgia. I 
want to know in order to form beliefs about which team is better than 
the other. Or, I may ask Dave because I bet that University of Georgia 
would win, and I plan to use my winnings to pay back my student loans. 
However, I may want to know just to know. Regardless of what aim the 
knowledge is for, there is one. In simple cases, when a child asks about 
the location of milk, we assume that the testimonial knowledge is for 
satisfying the hearer’s desire to get milk. In difficult cases, the testimony 
is for knowing whether a person committed a crime. The simplicity and 
difficulty of these cases depends, to some extent, on what the testimony 
is for. A child satisfying her desire to drink milk is less important of an aim 
than an officer arresting someone. Given the significance of the hearers’ 
aims, it is obvious for why reductionism and non-reductionism appear 
right at first glance. The reductionist’s positive reasons are appropriate 
for the officer to be justified in arresting someone. The non-reductionist’s 
trusting relationship is appropriate for the child to be justified in 
satisfying her desire to drink milk. There is a balance between the 
methods that hearers justify testimony and hearers’ aims for acquiring 
knowledge. Arresting a person is serious, so your justification better be 
strong. A child drinking milk is trivial, so your justification can be 
something accordingly weak. Both reductionism and non-reductionism 
can seek this balance between testimonial justification and the hearers’ 
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aims. In this way, there is little disagreement between both theories. 
Instead of worrying about the legitimacy of either camp, the issue is 
establishing the balance between the methods of testimonial justification 
and hearers’ attitudes and actions. The view of knowing for is compatible 
with tricky cases.       
 What does knowing for say about tricky cases? Some tricky cases, 
such as direction cases, do not suggest a particular method of testimonial 
justification. For example, consider Lackey’s original Chicago visitor case. 
Morris is a tourist in Chicago and he asks a passerby on the street for 
directions to the Sears Tower. The passerby says, “Two blocks east.” Why 
is Morris justified? I’m not sure. No information suggests that Morris has 
a trusting relationship with passerby citizens in Chicago or any sort of 
communal relationship with people. Morris does not acquire positive 
reasons. The view of knowing for remains useful, because this view does 
not commit one to a particular method of testimonial justification. Any 
method of testimonial justification is compatible with my view so long as 
the method takes into account hearers’ aims for knowing. For example, if 
you are a tourist, who wants to visit the Tower, then believing that 
testimony is justified may be based on a tour guide’s testimony. 
However, suppose that you are a cartographer, who is creating a map of 
the city of Chicago. You would not request testimony from a city guide; 
rather, you would likely ask your excellent research assistant. You may 
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not merely accept what your assistant says, but further request that the 
researcher give primary and secondary sources. You may believe that 
since you are creating a map of the city, you must precisely know the 
locations of the city’s buildings. Testimonial knowledge for visiting the 
Sears Tower as opposed to creating a map is justified in different ways.
 Let us return to the origin of this inquiry. The problem for 
reductionism and non-reductionism is that neither captures Greco’s 
difficult, tricky and simple cases as genuine knowledge. My proposal of 
knowing for accomplishes this task. Why is a seasoned investigator 
justified in believing a potentially uncooperative witness? Why is a job 
interviewer justified in believing that the interviewee does not have a 
criminal record? If you want to know the location of a train station and 
you ask a stranger for directions, why are you justified in believing the 
passerby? If you ask your friend whether she will go to the party, how do 
you know what she says is true? If a third-grade teacher tells her student 
that France is in Europe, then why does the third-grade student know? 
And finally, if a mother tells her adolescent child that there is milk in the 
refrigerator, why is the child justified in believing that this is so? Knowing 
for holds that hearers’ aims for knowing is related to the correct method 
of testimonial justification. The investigator’s aim to possibly arrest 
someone, job interviewer’s aim to hire someone in their company, your 
aim to visit the Sears Tower, your aim to go to the party, a child aim to 
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know that France is in Europe and drink milk are related to determining 
the appropriate way to be justified in believing a speaker’s testimony. 
Overall, my view progresses the stagnant debate between reductionism 
and non-reductionism.      
 Broadly speaking, what should we do with reductionism and non-
reductionism? Any staunch reductionist or non-reductionist is an 
opponent to my view of knowing for. However, recent work in the 
epistemology of testimony includes this trend of rejecting both 
reductionism and non-reductionism. Audi claims, “It should be evident 
that I am rejecting both wholesale reductionism and wholesale anti-
reductionism.”26 Others reject the debate and offer alternative analyses 
of testimony. Lackey claims, 
In showing the need for positive epistemic work from both the 
speaker and hearer, then, we have seen that testimonial 
justification or warrant is neither reducible to nor completely 
independent from sense perception, memory, and inductive 
inference. Thus, insofar as we wish to make genuine progress in 
the epistemology of testimony, we need to move beyond the 
debate between reductionism and non-reductionism.27 
 
Speakers and hearers must perform positive epistemic work. Neither 
reductionism nor non-reductionism can account for the positive 
epistemic work from speakers and hearers; thus, Lackey rejects the 
reductionism and non-reductionism. In this way, Lackey may agree with 
my assumption that testimonial knowledge is a relation between 
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speakers and hearers, because both hearers and speakers are related by 
their positive epistemic work. However, on my view, the debate between 
reductionism and non-reductionism diminishes, because both theories 
are grounded in the same way, knowing for. After we recognize that 
there is a relation between the methods of testimonial justification and 
hearers’ aims for knowledge, we can explain why positive reasons are 
appropriate for interrogators to know and trusting relationships are 
appropriate for children to know. We must cast out the labels of 
‘reductionism’ and ‘non-reductionism’ because explaining why hearers 
are justified in believing testimony is answered by explaining the relation 
between the methods of testimonial justification and hearers’ aims for 
knowledge. In the next two sections, I apply knowing for to the 
conceptions of a positive reason and a trusting relationship. 
 
§4 Improving Positive Reasons 
According to Greco and others, the reductionist positive reasons 
requirement is too demanding for some hearers to know. It comes as no 
surprise that the reductionist camp has dwindled in number, while the 
non-reductionist camp grows.28 Until this point, I have discussed knowing 
for as a comprehensive view of testimonial justification. In this section, I 
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will apply knowing for to the reductionist conception of a positive reason. 
 A positive reason is typically defined as non-testimonially based 
evidence to be justified in believing the testimony. Examples of non-
testimonially based evidence include perception, memory, deductive or 
inductive logical methods. More precisely, the view asserts, 
Positive Reason: For consideration C, to be a reason, R, for hearer, 
H, to justify believing that P, there must be some C that is 
reducible to perception, memory and induction, C must be non-
testimonially based belief and the truth of C evidentially supports 
the truth of P.  
 
Here, ‘consideration C’ is understood as perceptual, memory or 
inductive-based knowledge. All positive reasons are considerations but 
not all considerations are positive reasons. Considerations, which are not 
reasons, can affect what it takes to be a reason for believing that the 
testimony is justified.29 For considerations to be positive reasons, the 
truth of the consideration must evidentially support the truth of the 
testimony. Now, let us see how the idea of knowing for can be applied 
here.          
 To maneuver the conception of a positive reason away from 
Greco’s horn that positive reasons are too demanding, this conception 
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proposes that what counts as a positive reason must be commensurable 
with hearers’ aims for knowing.  
Commensurability Principle: For consideration, C, to be a reason, 
R, for a hearer, H, to justify believing that P, there must be some C 
such that the evidential support is commensurable with the 
degree of significance that knowing how believing that P is 
justified affects H’s aims for acquiring testimonial knowledge.  
  
The Commensurability Principle states that the evidential support for P is 
also commensurable with the degree of significance of knowing for the 
hearer. The degree of significance is how a hearer’s testimonial 
knowledge that P affects the H’s aims. All hearers believe and act 
differently after acquiring testimonial knowledge. These attitudes and 
actions affect the hearer in a multitude of unpredictable ways. One may 
encourage a value metric of the hearer’s attitudes and actions. Knowing 
the value of the hearer’s attitudes and actions would determine the sort 
of positive reason to know. However, this view need not be restricted to 
merely a value metric. For example, suppose that you have waited all of 
your life to visit the Sears Tower. You have a passion for architecture and 
love its king design. You are walking in Chicago and become lost trying to 
find it. As you look for directions, you consider asking a random passerby 
similar to most tourists. However, based on your passion for the Sears 
Tower’s architecture, you really don’t want to waste your time depending 
on a random person. Instead, you go out of your way to gather positive 
reasons by finding an expert tour guide and even use your binoculars to 
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find the building’s location. In this case, assigning a value to your 
attitudes and actions appears inappropriate because it is based on your 
passion to visit the Sears Tower.  As a result, I would encourage 
reductionists not to restrict or even necessarily identify exactly what 
degree of significance that the testimony holds for speakers; rather, they 
should develop the conceptual tools that include most, if not all cases of 
testimonial knowledge as genuine. If reductionism can accommodate 
how what counts as a positive reason for testimonial justification is 
different for each hearer, then reductionism is not as demanding as 
Greco would have us believe. For example, we would say that something 
is wrong in a court case when the judge, who rules over the case, does 
not actually hear the speaker’s testimony. If the judge is going to rule in a 
particular case, then she must hear it for herself. However, would we also 
say that something is wrong if a citizen, who is also epistemically 
interested in knowing the speaker’s testimony, does not hear it with their 
own senses? Both the judge and citizen want to know what the person 
said. However, the citizen is merely curious about the case. It seems that 
if the citizen listens to the testimony from other speakers or through a 
transcript, the citizen knows. For the judge and citizen, the evidential 
support is commensurable with the degree of significance of their aims 
for knowledge.   
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This account of positive reasons picks out why some 
considerations become reasons for this hearer and not reasons for 
another hearer. The virtue of this account is to achieve some flexibility 
for justifying testimony. Despite the generally correct characterization 
that reductionism is too demanding, on my view, what counts as a 
positive reason for this or that hearer fluctuates between different 
hearers’ aims or their attitudes and actions. Since every hearer will 
inevitably believe and act differently based on the speaker’s testimony, 
this account of positive reasons accommodates how hearers must 
acquire different sorts of positive reasons and why those reasons are 
appropriate in some cases but not others. Generally, the traditional 
reductionism account has yet to explain why children know. However, my 
view casts a wider net in apprehending the practical fact that testimony is 
pervasive.  
 
§5 Improving Trusting Relationships 
Non-reductionism holds that hearers know if and only if (1) 
speakers have a trusting relationship with speakers (2) there are no 
defeaters. The methods of testimonial justification include a trusting 
relationship and the absence of defeaters. A trusting relationship is a 
promising candidate as an irreducible epistemic source, because it 
Camacho, John, UMSL, 2012, 38. 
 
explains the practical fact that testimony is pervasive.30 Melissa Koenig, a 
developmental psychologist, claims,  
[Children and adults] ordinarily take people at their word. When a 
speaker reports some fact, the listener believes the report simply 
because of the trust they place, not in the utterance, but in the 
speaker. The speaker, in these cases, is the object of appraisal and 
it is based on her authority that testimony is accepted.31 
 
Here, Koenig emphasizes that the trust between speakers and hearers is 
a regular occurrence. Hearers know, not based on the content of words, 
but the speaker’s authority. If we accept the practical fact that testimony 
is pervasive and non-reductionism does not burden hearers by requiring 
that they have positive reasons, then the non-reductionist component of 
a trusting relationship is useful. However, Greco argues that non-
reductionism fails to explain why interrogators acquire testimonial 
knowledge. His criticism can be best understood as non-reductionism 
failing to explain the practical fact that testimony is dependable. A 
trusting relationship is a low degree of justification. Thus, a trusting 
relationship is not dependable enough to provide sufficient justification 
when the knowledge is for interrogators or other difficult cases. The path 
for a solution is to revise the conception of a trusting relationship in 
order to also explain the practical fact that testimony is dependable.  
 I motivate non-reductionism by giving two studies on its empirical 
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plausibility. First, I will give empirical research that suggests children 
employ defeaters for rejecting a speaker’s testimony. If children employ 
defeaters, then the study leans toward the non-reductionist requirement 
that hearers accept testimony in the absence of defeaters. I’ll then delve 
into empirical research on what makes a trusting relationship so 
epistemically special.  After I evaluate the research, I apply the notion of 
knowing for to the non-reductionist conception of a trusting relationship. 
Given my revised conception of a trusting relationship, I’ll propose future 
empirical research for non-reductionism to account for the fact that 
testimony is dependable. Koenig discusses a study that displays children’s 
ability to employ defeaters for rejecting a speaker’s testimony as 
knowledge. Dias and Harris and Leevers and Harris independently 
showed that four-, five- and six-year old children are capable of early 
syllogistic reasoning.32 In a study conducted by Lee, Cameron, Doucette 
and Talwar, they support that children use defeaters before accepting 
testimony as knowledge. The team found that children in preschool use 
their prior knowledge when evaluating what someone says.33 A speaker 
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says to the children, “As the speaker was away, a ghost jumped out of the 
book and broke a drinking glass.” Three-year olds accept the speaker’s 
statement as true, however, most six-year olds say that the speaker 
broke the glass. Even though the speaker may not have broken the glass, 
some children minimally believe that the ghost did not break the glass. 
Koenig argues,  
This early ability to distinguish true from false assertions is some 
of the first evidence we have of children’s capacity for 
distinguishing between testimonial input that is consistent with 
their beliefs and input that goes against their beliefs. This 
sensitivity to counterevidence is part of what makes it possible to 
credit children, even toddlers, with testimonial knowledge.34 
                           
These children’s capacity to discriminate is how they choose between the 
testimony from others and what they believe. Here, we can identify their 
capacity to discriminate and background knowledge of ghosts and 
drinking glasses as giving them defeaters. The children, who say that the 
speaker broke the glass, know that the ghost did not break the glass. In 
this sense, six-year-olds have a defeater or reason against accepting 
testimony as knowledge—ghosts cannot break drink glasses. On the 
other hand, the three-year old children, who accept the speaker’s 
testimony that the ghost broke the glass, lack such a defeater. 
Importantly the empirical research demonstrates that some six-year olds 
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have defeaters. Since the empirical research demonstrates that some 
children employ defeaters for rejecting testimony, we can now turn to an 
empirical analysis on a trusting relationship. 
Paul Harris and Kathleen Corriveau, who are child developmental 
psychologists, tested 147 five-year-old children, who have three different 
types of attachments with their mothers: avoidant, secure and anxious. 
These attachment types are interactive behaviors. Avoidant attachment 
is a child who rarely or does not seek proximity to or contact with the 
mother.35 The child is preoccupied with play when the adult enters the 
room. The child does not display a desire for contact. If an adult picks up 
the child, the child merely accepts the contact. A secure attachment is a 
child who can be comforted by strangers, “but it is clear that she wants 
her mother.”36 The child clearly desires contact but displays relatively 
little effort to gain contact. An anxious attachment is the child who 
displays “moderate –to-strong seeking of proximity to their mother.”37 
Proximity seeking behavior includes a child purposefully approaching the 
adult by creeping, crawling or walking. The child may clamber up or grasp 
the adult in order to gain contact. In the groups, 26 children were 
                                                          
35
 E. Waters, J. Crowell, M. Elliott, D. Corcoran and D. Treboux “Bowlby’s Secure Base 
Theory and the Social Personality Psychology of Attachment Styles: Work(s) in Progress” 
Attachment and Human Development, 4, 230-242. For my purposes, I am using an 
abstracted pdf version: 
http://www.psychology.sunysb.edu/attachment/measures/content/ss_scoring.pdf. 
Quotes and page numbers are from here. 
36
E. Waters et. al, “Mary Ainsworth Strange Situation Classification,” 11. 
37
 E. Waters et. al, “Mary Ainsworth Strange Situation Classification,” 13.  
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avoidant attachment, 96 children had secure attachment and 25 had 
anxious attachment relationships. All of the children were shown pictures 
of 50-50 animal hybrids, such as a cow-horse.38 Remember, since the 
ambiguous objects are 50-50 hybrids, children are neither right nor 
wrong for choosing the mother’s or stranger’s testimony. The mother 
and stranger told the children different names of the object, such as 
either a horse or a cow. After receiving conflicting testimony, children 
chose which speaker was correct. In the results, Harris claims, “Children 
with an avoidant attachment to their mother treated her no differently 
from a stranger, whereas the other two groups trusted the claims made 
by their mother over those made by the stranger.”39 Children with 
avoidant attachment were slightly more likely to pick the stranger’s, 53%, 
than the mother’s testimony, 47%. For secure attachment relationships, 
children sided with their mother 64% of the time and 34% chose the 
stranger. In anxious attachment relationships, 75% of the children 
accepted their mother’s testimony and picked the stranger 25% of the 
time. But, what exactly is it about their relationship that is epistemically 
significant? According to the study, the explanation for why children 
accept their mother’s testimony is not having any sort of relationship 
with their mothers; rather, children need a secure or anxious relationship 
                                                          
38
 See images at Appendix 1 on p. 37.  
39
 Paul Harris and Kathleen H. Corriveau “Young Children’s Selective Trust in Informants” 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society Biological Sciences 366, (2011): 1179-
1187, 1181.  
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to accept testimony. Children in anxious and secure relationships were 
statistically more likely to accept their mother’s testimony than children 
in avoidant attachment relationships. An implication is that we can 
narrow the candidates of special irreducible features to secure and 
anxious relationships. For instance example, Frederick Schmitt who 
supports non-reductionism claims, "Children are so constituted 
psychologically that they tend to prefer their caretakers or parents as 
sources of information and also as sources of information about where to 
get information.”40 Every child is not psychologically disposed to prefer 
their parent’s testimony. Schmitt’s view is only accurate about children 
with anxious and secure attachment relationships. He further argues, 
“The process of selecting testimony is a social process in which the child’s 
disposition to prefer caretakers as sources of information cause the child 
to defer to the caretaker’s choices of testimonial sources for the child. 
And this social selection process is metareliable.”41 Schmitt claims that 
children further depend on their caregivers to tell them the correct 
sources of information. If children with anxious and secure relationships 
depend on their parent’s testimony in a strong way as Schmitt suggests, 
the apparent question is, “What constitutes a secure and anxious 
relationship that makes it epistemically significant?”  
                                                          
40
Frederick Schmitt, “Social Epistemology” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (eds.) 
John Greco and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999): 354-382, 367.   
41
Frederick Schmitt, “Social Epistemology,” 367. 
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One response is a version of Jennifer Lackey’s criticism against the 
Interpersonal View of Testimony (IVT). This view holds (1) the features of 
an interpersonal relationship between speakers and hearers, including a 
speaker giving her assurance or inviting the hearer to trust, confer 
epistemic value on the hearer’s acquired testimony (2) epistemic 
justification is non-evidential.42 Lackey questions the epistemic relevance 
of a speaker giving her assurance or inviting a hearer to trust. 
Analogously, one may question that epistemic relevance of a secure or 
anxious relationship. Instead of attributing knowledge to children, we 
should recognize that children are making poor inferences. Children infer 
from their mother’s social behavior, proximity and physical contact with 
them to the idea that their mother transmits reliable testimony. But, 
what is epistemically relevant about proximity and physical contact? This 
is a false correlation argument. Children can appropriately infer from 
their mother’s emotional social interaction that the mother is a good 
person or someone who makes one feel protected, but these reasons are 
inappropriate when applied to justifying the name of an ambiguous cow-
horse or bear-pig object. The mother’s social interaction does not clearly 
bear any epistemic import onto whether or not she is a reliable testifier. 
Any non-reductionist, including Schmitt, needs to explain the epistemic 
significance of a trusting relationship.  
                                                          
42
Advocates of this view include Ross (1986), Hinchman (2005), Moran (2006) and 
Faulkner (2007).  
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Another response for the epistemic significance of a trusting 
relationship comes from Harris, who provides a parting shot against 
entitlement theories of justification about children, 
Despite a long-standing assumption, especially within philosophy, 
that young children don’t doubt what they are told, it is clear that 
children can be more or less skeptical. They are willing to put their 
questions to someone they know, and they often (but not always) 
accept what that person says. They hesitate to place their trust in 
a stranger. Indeed, even their trust in someone they know is not 
automatic. Its strength varies, depending on the type of emotional 
relationship that the child has to the person in question.43  
   
Initially, Harris endorses non-reductionism, because children, in fact, do 
accept testimony depending on their kind of relationship with the 
speaker.44 However, it is not a ringing endorsement. Harris rejects the 
non-reductionist’s Entitlement Component that children blindly accept 
testimony as knowledge. Instead, children observe whether speakers are 
reliable testifiers. Children doubt what others tell them. Children’s 
trusting relationships with their caregivers varies based on their 
emotional relationship with caregivers. Importantly, notice that Harris 
equates the trusting relationship as an emotional relationship. The 
problem then for advocates of a trusting relationship is to explain how a 
trusting relationship is not exclusively an emotional relationship but also 
an epistemic one.  
                                                          
43
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44
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              The idea of knowing for is helpful to defend non-reductionism. 
Proponents of non-reductionism can create future empirical research to 
confirm or deny: (1) the epistemic relevance of trusting relationships and 
(2) whether a trusting relationship can explain the fact that testimony is 
dependable. For the first task, empirical research can test a trusting 
relationship in different scenarios. For example, if children know that 
getting the right answer leads to their receiving either chocolate or 
broccoli to eat, then the question becomes would children in avoidant 
attachment relationships accept their mother’s testimony more than a 
stranger’s testimony? Do the results change when knowledge is for 
broccoli as opposed to chocolate? If a child wants to eat chocolate more 
than broccoli, then knowing that the testimony is for chocolate creates 
an extra incentive to be right. Children with an avoidant attachment 
relationship with their mothers may accept their mother’s testimony 
when the stakes are higher.  
Second, non-reductionism can get closer to capturing the fact that 
testimony is dependable. Non-reductionists can examine research that 
tests whether interrogators and uncooperative witnesses, in fact, build 
trusting relationships with each other without positive reasons. Suppose 
that two interrogators work the good cop/bad cop routines or similar 
ones to form a trusting relationship with uncooperative witnesses. If cops 
know the speaker’s testimony based on good cop/bad cop routines or 
Camacho, John, UMSL, 2012, 47. 
 
any strategy without positive reasons, then non-reductionism can show 
why a trusting relationship explains why testimony is dependable. 
Empirical research on the effectiveness of similar tactics that build 
trusting relationships will determine the success or failure of this version 
of non-reductionism.     
 
§6 Conclusion 
This paper began by examining Greco’s everyday cases of 
testimonial knowledge. All six cases exemplify two practical facts: 
testimony is pervasive and dependable. Greco turns these cases into the 
RT Dilemma that challenges the dominant reductionist and non-
reductionist theories of testimonial justification. According to the 
dilemma, both reductionism and non-reductionism fail to capture the 
practical facts of testimony. My contribution is to solve Greco’s dilemma 
by explaining all six cases in the same way, knowing for. Hearers’ aim for 
knowing is related to the appropriate way for hearers to justify their 
testimonial beliefs. Testimonial justification is a matter of degrees. 
Knowing for is capable of explaining the spectrum of testimonial 
knowledge that encompasses positive reasons and trusting relationships; 
while at the same time, abandoning the debate between reductionism 
and non-reductionism. After explaining Greco’s cases, I apply knowing for 
to develop enhanced conceptions of a positive reason and a trusting 
Camacho, John, UMSL, 2012, 48. 
 
relationship. On my view, positive reasons are more flexible account of 
positive reasons that leans closer to explaining the pervasive fact of 
testimony. Moreover, I considered empirical research on children’s 
trusting relationships with their mothers. I argue that additional studies 
are needed on children and proposed new experiments on interrogators 
to determine whether a trusting relationship is a dependable epistemic 
source. Even though, I have yet to offer a complete theory of testimonial 
knowledge, any theory of testimonial justification must consider the 
arguments presented here.  
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Appendix A: Examples of 50-50 hybrids 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 50-50 Horse-Cow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 50-50 Pig-Bear 
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